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Abstract
Background: Intervention studies for depression and intimate partner violence (IPV) commonly incorporate
screening to identify eligible participants. The challenge is that current ethical evaluation is largely informed by the
four principle approach applying principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, and respect for justice and autonomy.
We examine three intervention studies for IPV, postnatal depression (PND) and depression that used screening
from the perspective of principlism, followed by the perspective of a narrative and relational approach. We suggest
that a narrative and relational approach to ethics brings to light concerns that principlism can overlook.
Discussion: The justification most commonly used to incorporate screening is that the potential benefits of
identifying intervention efficacy balance the risk of individual harm. However, considerable risks do exist. The
discovery of new information may result in further depression or worries, people might feel burdened, open to
further risk, unsure of whether to disclose information to family members and disappointed if they are allocated to
a control group. This raises questions about study design and whether the principle of equipoise remains an
adequate justification in studies with vulnerable groups. In addition, autonomy is said to be respected because
participants give informed consent to participate. However, the context of where recruitment is undertaken has
been shown to influence how people make decisions.
Summary: The four principles have been subjected to criticisms in recent years but they remain prominent in
public health and medical research. We provide a set of simple, interrogative questions that are narrative and
relationally driven which may assist to further evaluate the potential impacts of using screening to identify eligible
research participants in intervention studies. A narrative and relational based approach requires seeing people as
situated within their social and cultural contexts, and as existing within relationships that are likely to be affected
by the results of screening information.
Background
Participating in health care intervention studies can
a f f e c tm o r et h a nt h ef u t u r ec o u r s eo fp e o p l e ’s health.
Considerable attention has been given to ensuring that
individuals provide informed consent with their auton-
omy and privacy protected in research studies. However,
intervention studies, particularly those in depression and
intimate partner violence (IPV), raise additional ethical
considerations beyond autonomy, privacy and justice.
The challenge is that current ethical evaluation of
intervention studies in primary medical care is largely
informed by Beauchamp and Childress’s four principle
approach. This is articulated by the principles of benefi-
cence, non-maleficence, respect for justice and auton-
omy; and is referred to as ‘principlism’ [1].
Under principlism moral deliberation is guided by: ben-
eficence as ‘the obligation to act to provide benefits (posi-
tive) and to balance benefits, risks and costs to produce
overall results (utility)’; non-maleficence as ‘the obligation
to avoid causing harm’; respect for autonomy as ‘the obli-
gation to respect the decision-making capacity of the
autonomous person’; and justice as ‘the obligation of fair-
ness in the distribution of benefits and risks’ [2]. The
principles are flexible in their interpretation and embrace
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deontology (duty based ethics) and utilitarianism (pro-
duce the greatest good for the greatest number) [3].
The four principles have been subjected to criticisms
in recent years but they remain prominent in public
health and medical research in spite of recent develop-
ments in public health to explore relational ethics [4]
and other ethical frameworks [5]. Whilst some advocate
that principlism is an easy to apply template that makes
organizational sense [6], our paper advocates for the
need to move beyond only principlism in the assessment
and ethical evaluation of complex public health inter-
ventions, such as the use of screening within interven-
tion studies. We do this by examining how screening to
identify eligible research participants was used in three
intervention studies for IPV, postnatal depression (PND)
and depression. We suggest that a narrative and rela-
tional based approach to this problem brings to light
concerns that principlism can overlook.
The ethics of incorporating screening in
intervention studies
Screening is a practice where individuals are investigated
to detect unrecognized disease or its precursors [7], and
recently to identify probable symptoms of psychosocial
conditions like depression or to detect abuse and vio-
lence. Routine and universal screening for psychosocial
issues in the general population is a controversial prac-
tice [8-10], which makes its use within intervention stu-
dies questionable. In routine population-based
screening, ‘sufficient risk for further investigation or
direct prevention’ is identified [11], however in interven-
tion studies, especially if they are randomized controlled
trials (RCTS), participants may not receive prevention
or treatment options. This makes the use of screening
within psychosocial studies testing for intervention
effectiveness a complex moral issue.
Possible reasons for psychosocial interventions are
‘diverse problems such as childhood abuse and neglect,
postnatal depression (PND), social isolation, and partner
abuse’ [12]. Many of these problems co-exist and are
closely associated resulting in intervention studies over-
lapping. Available evidence indicates that child abuse is
a risk factor for intimate partner violence (IPV), depres-
sion is one of the most common sequelae of IPV
[13,14], and PND occurs at a rate of 13% in new
mothers during the early months post delivery; some of
which can be related to IPV [8,15].
The view that routine and universal screening is a
simple, quick and cheap method to improve the quality
of care for depression [16] may provide an attractive
solution for governments to curtail projected increases
in disease burden [17]. Emerging evidence suggests that
screening for PND does not represent value for money
predominantly due to additional costs of managing
women incorrectly diagnosed as depressed (false positive
scores) [18]. However, the United States Preventative
Task Force (USPTF) review of studies for depression
including screening indicated some improvements in
recognition, treatment and health outcomes for patients
[19]. Since the USPTF and others who have conducted
systematic reviews of IPV screening have not found suf-
ficient evidence to recommend universal screening, its
use within intervention studies remains somewhat open
to discussion [20,21]. The contradictions about screen-
ing effectiveness and inadequate evidence for follow-up
interventions when there are highly correlated psychoso-
cial problems raised by these reviews suggests ethical
complexities exist about its use within public health
intervention studies.
The evidence base regarding the impact of screening
and its uses in intervention studies is still in nascent
stages. Progress for measuring the impact of IPV screen-
ing for example has been said to be impeded by three
assumptions: that completing a screening test has no
impact on individuals (tools are neutral), assessing
screening by retrospective rather than prospective analy-
sis is suitable and that there is a lack of agreed appropri-
ate intervention for IPV once identified [10]. These
assumptions equally apply to measuring the impacts of
screening for depression and PND in intervention stu-
dies. While there is limited information about the
impact of screening in intervention studies, the techni-
que is commonly used in depression, PND and IPV stu-
dies particularly as a method to identify or recruit
eligible research participants.
The question of whether to incorporate screening
within intervention studies has received very little atten-
tion. Studies of IPV [9,22] and postpartum depression
[8] have indicated that stigma, fear of disclosure and
beliefs about the limitations of management may lead
women to deliberately under-report symptoms or fac-
tors. Screening for psychosocial problems also raises the
question of surveillance, especially for women experien-
cing IPV or depression concerned about the removal of
children by child protection services or partners accus-
ing them in court of being unfit mothers [23]. There-
fore, being screened – even at the level of determining
eligibility for a study and nota sp a r to fa ni n t e r v e n t i o n
itself – is complicated.
Further considerations about using screening for
recruitment in an intervention relate to whether screen-
ing tools provide accurate and efficient identification of
potential risk or cases because of the detection of false
positives and false negatives [17]. There is uncertainty
around identifying the most suitable tool, given that for
IPV alone there are more than 33 tools available to
measure abuse [10]. Studies also need to consider who
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Indeed, some question if ‘screening’ is the appropriate
term to use in IPV research since the complex and hid-
den nature of IPV belies the pre-symptomatic disease
states for which screening tools are generally designed
[10]. In additional file 1 we outline three intervention
studies where screening was used to recruit or identify
eligible participants into randomized controlled trials
(RCTs) for depression, PND and IPV [24-26].
S t u d yo n ei sap r a g m a t i cr a n d omized controlled trial
(RCT) in antenatal clinics to deliver a Preparing for Par-
enthood structured intervention to reduce risk factors
for PND [24]. Study two is a multimodal counseling
intervention RCT to improve postpartum outcomes in
African American mothers [26]. Study three is a RCT to
improve rates of depression, hopelessness and suicide
ideation in elderly patients by placing depression health
specialists in primary care practices [25]. Study one and
two comparison groups were assigned to treatment as
usual (TAU) standard care processes [24,26]. Study
three also assigned participants to TAU control groups
however individuals were informed that they qualified
for a diagnosis of depression if they screened positive
and they were referred back to their primary care provi-
der who was provided with a written assessment of the
person’s psychiatric condition and any presence of suici-
dal ideation or hopelessness [27]. All three studies tar-
geted vulnerable groups: women in their first pregnancy,
poor pregnant African-American women and elderly
patients. The fact that participants were screened and
identified as at-risk of depression, PND or IPV raises
some questions about the suitability of TAU for the
comparison groups; an issue that has been given atten-
tion by a number of authors previously [27-30].
The three studies are drawn upon to demonstrate the
ethical issues that emerge from using screening to iden-
tify or recruit for intervention studies; our analysis does
not focus on the interventions that were subsequently
delivered to participants. The issues are ethically evalu-
ated first by using principlism and subsequently from
the perspective of narrative and relational theories.
Ethical issues raised by screening in the three
study examples – the view of principlism
Each of the studies in additional file 1 used screening as
am e t h o dt oi d e n t i f ya n dr e c r uit eligible participants.
Reynolds et al. [25] randomly sampled 50% of patients
aged 60-74 years and 100% aged ≥75 years from primary
care settings and administered the Center for Epidemio-
logical Studies of Depression (CES-D) scale by tele-
phone. Those who screened positive (≥ 11 score) were
invited to meet with a research assistant on their next
visit to a practice to learn more about the study, and if
willing, complete a formal assessment to determine
eligibility. Brugha et al. [24] asked women in their first
pregnancy to complete the ‘Pregnancy and You’ screen-
ing questionnaire at their antenatal appointments. If
they screened positive (presence of any one of six
depression items) women were invited to participate in
the intervention. El-Mohandes et al. [26] screened
women by audio computer-assisted survey interview
(ACASI) to determine eligibility of women with reported
risks in designated areas of depression, smoking, envir-
onmental tobacco smoke exposure and IPV. Depression
screening was determined using the Beck Inventory II
and IPV by asking two questions related to physical/sex-
ual harm and being afraid of a partner.
A d d i t i o n a lf i l e2p r e s e n t ss o m eo ft h ek e ya r g u m e n t s
that a principle based approach would cover about the
issue of whether to screen or not screen to determine
eligibility for, or to recruit to an intervention. In the
next section we expand on these key arguments by
reference to the three studies to explore the ethical
issues.
Beneficence – balancing benefits against risks
Beneficence obliges researchers to act to provide bene-
fits to research participants (positive benefits) and for
these benefits to be balanced against any risks and costs
(utility). Benefit is often determined by the concept of
substantial benefit which refers to ‘an outcome that now
or in the future might be regarded by the [research par-
ticipant] as worthwhile’ [31]. All three studies could pro-
vide outcomes that are worthwhile now or in the future.
The justification for many intervention studies testing
for effectiveness is based on the premise of utility – that
there will be positive benefits to the wider population if
an intervention is identified as being effective. For exam-
ple, earlier detection of suicide ideation may prevent
serious individual harm for the elderly, the identification
of risk of PND may improve maternal and child health
outcomes and the detection of IPV might increase a
woman and her children’s safety. However, the challenge
is that often the ethical justification is based on a belief
that positive benefit will result from participation, but
these benefits cannot be guaranteed as an effect because
this is determined at study completion.
Some have thus questioned the use of treatment as
usual (TAU) as a control condition particularly in psy-
chosocial RCTs where serious risks may be identified in
a comparison group, for example pregnant black women
at risk of serious, even life-threatening harm from IPV,
because not everyone who screens positive is provided
with an intervention, follow up or wait list control
option [26]. On the other hand, to remain ethically
committed to participants, TAU health care profes-
sionals may be provided with further information about
patients to offset risk. Thus, the comparison is not really
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is disrupted because components of TAU have been
changed [25,29]. The exact nature of TAU is also diffi-
cult to document since health care providers for those
in the comparison group could be quite different and
frequency of contact could differ [32]. Moreover, for
some conditions TAU may be seen as substandard care
or similar to receiving no treatment which introduces a
tension between the potential public benefits (justice) of
establishing intervention effectiveness and the need to
minimize risks for individuals (beneficence) [29]. Testing
for psychosocial intervention effectiveness may therefore
be difficult to ascertain within the RCT design that uses
TAU. When screening is used with such vulnerable
populations who are identified as at risk of depression,
PND or IPV; it seems that there is little option but to
provide a form of augmented TAU care to remain
ethical.
There is no doubt that the common justification for
incorporating screening to identify eligible study partici-
pants is related to beneficence or the hypothesized ben-
efits (for individuals and the population) that could
result from determining the efficacy of an intervention.
However, one trial completed to evaluate the effective-
ness of screening to recruit participants to a psychother-
apy RCT determined the method to be ineffective [33].
Similar to studies of IPV screening, whilst the majority
of women completed the screening questionnaire, only a
minority affected agreed to be contacted and assessed.
Of those who declined further contact the reasons
included being too shy, not thinking that they were
depressed enough, not wanting to be labeled and the
GP telling them that they were not depressed [33]. Stu-
dies have found that non-participation is elevated in the
presence of a history of mental disorders (or psychoso-
cial issues as caused by IPV experiences) [34]. Therefore,
determining some of the reasons why non-participation
occurs is an important ethical consideration for consid-
ering the use of screening for IPV and depression in
intervention studies.
Screening, new diagnoses and disclosure: doing no harm?
Under the principle of non-maleficence we are obliged
to avoid harm, however, there is a potential for harm to
occur in these three studies directly related to complet-
ing a screen. This is not only because of the study
designs where not everyone will receive a potentially
beneficial intervention, but also because screening brings
with it new information and possible burdens that did
not exist before. This information may change a per-
son’s sense of self, their identity and introduce new
health care pathways not previously considered. Whilst
t h ep o s s i b l eb e n e f i t so fa ni n t e r v e n t i o nm u s tb e
balanced against potential risks involved in each study,
before participants even engage in an intervention, being
screened to determine eligibility has introduced a new
and immediate risk of harm. For community based stu-
dies in depression and PND this relates to the burden of
new information about a diagnosis since screening can
be prospective and participants do not necessarily have
an existing diagnosis of depression [27]. Participants
may then receive new health information that causes
discomfort or new health care pathways not anticipated.
New diagnoses introduce the potential for those same
individuals to harm others by not disclosing diagnostic
information about depression or PND to family mem-
bers [35]. There is possible harm with detecting risk of
PND because the changes to a person’s self understand-
ing may compromise a mother’s resiliency and feelings
of agency. For those who disclosed in IPV studies there
is also the risk that if assigned to the intervention, it
may be unsuccessful. Participants may be disappointed
in their allocated status or in interventions, and further
harmed by IPV disclosure as women might fear retalia-
tion from partners or the involvement of police or other
government agencies such as child protection.
In all three of our study examples screening has
already occurred and alerted the participant to a poten-
tial issue that may require attention before they consent
to participate in the larger intervention. This new infor-
mation may influence people’s decision-making and
contribute to increased expectations of receiving a new
treatment or being provided with other supports which
is not the case with a RCT design. Indeed, others have
noted that there is a risk of increased hopelessness and
despair for people entering studies because when they
are depressed, for example, they may feel that in spite of
taking action they are not getting better [32]. Or, even
though participants are informed of being assigned to a
control group they can become demoralized or blame
themselves when they do not receive the intervention
[32].
Currently, the major justification that harm has been
avoided comes down to the fact that a participant has
provided informed consent. This emphasis on autono-
mous decision-making obscures these risks of harm that
we have outlined.
Screening and autonomy: informed decision-making?
Respect for autonomy is viewed as the obligation to
respect the decision-making capacity of the autonomous
person which is represented in intervention studies
through participants giving their informed consent.
Krantz et al. [36] have argued though that informed con-
sent is difficult to achieve with screening, since scientific
validity is not a topic that is easy to understand and the
public generally do not understand the problems asso-
ciated with tool design and interpretations. Indeed,
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complete a screening instrument to determine eligibility,
but their awareness of the tool being a screener for
depression, PND or IPV can be limited.
There is a prevailing view that screening tools are not
therapeutic (particularly when used to identify eligibility
in an intervention study) and so they are neutral, value-
free tools [10]. In the first instance, screening tools
function as ‘technologies of trust,’ that is, from the reci-
pients’ point of view the numerical value produced from
a tool can be seen to offer an objective and legitimate
view whereby results are accepted regardless of the
potential for a false positive result [37]. This trust in the
tool may well influence decisions that people subse-
quently make to participate in research, it may influence
expectations and we need to be aware that this might
contribute to the possible risk of demoralization, hope-
lessness or despair, as we outlined above.
In addition, it is not certain that people do make
informed decisions when they are vulnerable (during
pregnancy or elderly and possibly depressed). None of
the three studies we have examined call into question
the ability of participants to make their own decisions
to complete screening questionnaires, but the settings
where they are conducted increase their vulnerability.
For example, women in their first pregnancy were tar-
geted in Brugha et al’s intervention [24] and recruited
from hospitals, those pregnant and disadvantaged with a
high risk of IPV were targeted in El-Mohandes’ et al’s
intervention [26]. All of the participants might have
been said to be susceptible to ‘decisional pressures’, that
is, when a person is in unfamiliar surrounds like a hos-
pital they are ‘highly suggestible to figures in authority,
even when told to do things that they would not ordina-
rily do’ [38]. Elderly patients and any patient who has
a t t e n d e dap r i m a r yc a r ep r a c t i c ef o ral o n gp e r i o do f
time also develop trust in the setting and their provi-
ders. This trust may influence how they decide and
whether screening is an acceptable practice for them.
Moreover, when eligibility is determined within clinical
settings such as hospitals or primary care sites some-
times participants do not realize that the tests are not
required for their medical care. When we focus on
autonomy as the ability to simply provide informed con-
sent we fail to appreciate how one’s environment can
shape and affect decisions [39].
Screening and intervention design: just benefits?
Under the principle of justice there is the obligation to
fairly distribute the benefits and risks, Beauchamp and
Childress also suggest that the principle of justice
requires a commitment to ‘equals being treated equally
and unequals unequally’ [1]. So is it fair distribution of
benefits and risks to screen participants at risk of
psychosocial conditions and only provide an interven-
tion to one group? Some argue that one response to this
is to offer treatments where effectiveness has been
established to participants when a study is complete
(wait list control) [32]. In his paper explaining the
CABLES model to assess and minimize risk in research,
Koocher notes that researchers need to be mindful that
participants may have undergone ‘critical development
periods’ which vitiate the possible benefits of an inter-
vention [40]. Koocher proposes that six domains must
be attended to and evaluated to fully explore potential
risks for participants. These include: cognitive, affective,
biological, legal, environmental and social (CABLES). As
we have highlighted above, people who have been
screened for IPV, PND or depression may now have
knowledge that impacts on any one or more of these
domains.
Currently randomization is ethically justified using the
principle of equipoise ‘such that across the research
community there should be no clear belief regarding the
relative efficacy of one treatment condition over another’
[41,42]. However equipoise is premised on research
design being an unbiased and objective endeavor, which
is questionable and more suited to clinical drug trials or
interventions testing the effectiveness of a pharmacolo-
gical medication versus a complementary therapy for
example. In the case of psychosocial research designs a
great deal of effort is put into identifying all of the avail-
able evidence to support testing an intervention’s effec-
tiveness – which does raise some doubt about how
much ‘treatment’ uncertainty may exist. Indeed Miller
and Brody, along with others, have advocated for the
abandonment of clinical equipoise and proposed that a
clear distinction between therapeutic practice (clinical
or medical care) and clinical research is necessary
[43-46]. For unequals to be treated unequally in the
three studies, they must also receive benefits of being
identified as at-risk of depression, PND or IPV.
The possible limits of principlism
Whilst large scale public health interventions may be
assessed using a range of ethical theories, research inter-
vention studies are most often subjected to ethical
assessment by the application of the four principles.
Critics of principlism argue that the principles foster a
checklist approach to ethical problems [47], they
emphasize individual autonomy to the exclusion of con-
text and the inter-subjective nature of how people live
their lives, and how this can affect decision-making [48],
and they are universally applied [49]. Some feminists
and others have critiqued the sense of impartial delib-
eration, and focus on rationality and reasoning espoused
in principlism [50]. Criticisms have also been made
about its reliance on deductive rather than inductive
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cisms about deductive versus inductive approach with
the addition of ‘interpretation, specification, and balan-
cing of the principles in order to formulate policies and
decide about cases’ [51].
Even though we have attempted to specify and exam-
ine how the principles can be applied to the ethical
issues of using screening within intervention studies, it
is still unclear how we can resolve some of the ethical
tensions that have been raised. First, in the current
research context we cannot categorically rule out the
use of TAU as a control condition for psychosocial
interventions since effectiveness of an intervention
must be established and this is the most scientifically
rigorous method that currently exists. This brings into
question whether benefits and risks can be distributed
fairly when screening is used to identify people at risk
of depression, PND or experiencing IPV if no follow
up or wait list control is provided. In addition, we
know that there may well be substantive benefits to
result from some interventions if they are established,
but whether these unknown benefits outweigh the
immediate potential for harm for individuals that new
health information can bring is yet to be determined.
Since principlism leaves us at an impasse on the issue
of using screening within intervention studies, we now
deploy a narrative and relational approach to these
issues in an attempt to resolve tensions and explore
the issues in greater depth.
Ethical issues raised by the three study examples
– the view of narrative and relational ethics
Since the 1980s, narrative approaches have gained popu-
larity and introduced the importance of personal stories
and identity in medical and research ethics. Coupled
with this has been greater interest in narrative within
bioethics, although some have argued that narrative is
sometimes positioned as a helpmate to philosophy and
its importance as a field of inquiry in its own right is
sidelined [52]. Lindemann has noted that narrative
approaches ‘challenge the assumption that ethics has
primarily to do with right conduct among strangers, is
universalizable and favors no one’ [53]. Narrative
emphasizes who people are, their relationships and how
these are to be valued if they are important, this is dif-
ferent to the highly individualized focus of principlism
and its potential to provide an abstracted, de-contextua-
lized view of ethical issues. Lindemann adds that narra-
tive approaches to ethics contest the view that moral
principles are law like, universal and unyielding. Instead,
they are ‘modifiable in light of the particulars of a given
experience or situation…[and] these particulars either
naturally take a narrative form or must be given a narra-
tive structure if they are to have meaning’ [53].
Central to this sense of humans as narrative beings is
a view of ethics as relationally constituted. Not only is
narrative and identity intimately connected, but we exist
in relation with others. Drawing on Young’sw o r k ,
Kenny et al. [4] propose that ‘relational persons develop
and deploy their values within the social worlds they
inhabit, conditioned by the opportunities and obstacles
that shape their lives according to the socially salient
features of their embodied lives (e.g. their gender, race,
class, age, disability status, ethnicity)’. These socially and
relationally salient features are fundamentally important
to understanding who we are as humans and they pro-
vide us with a different viewpoint from which to assess
ethical issues like using screening within an intervention
study.
Table 1 outlines some ethical considerations that have
emerged following our analysis of this issue from the
perspective of principlism. Some of the issues are about
the need to explore the contextual story about screening
– where does it occur? What are the important things
to consider in the environment and setting where
screening is being conducted? How does our socio-cul-
tural world impact on this experience of being screened?
Other matters relate to the need to acknowledge the
role of identity in deciding to participate in a study -
individual identity does matter and life experiences
influence a person’s decision to participate. In addition
to this, our relational world shapes how we may respond
to the experience of being screened to determine elig-
ibility for a study and raises new questions. From here,
we consider some of these narrative and relational issues
to help us better understand the ethical complexities of
using screening within interventions studies for IPV,
depression and PND.
Individual and relational Issues
Taylor argues that experience, interpretation and the
significance this forges has the possibility of changing a
person’s self-understanding, even if only partially [35].
People are not neutral spectators and so their experi-
ence of being screened and the meaning of a diagnosis
or label that could result is likely to be evaluated in the
context of their life [35]. Given this, it is important that
we fully appreciate who participants in our studies are
and consider how screening before an intervention may
impact on their identities and relationships. To appreci-
ate this means having available accounts of how partici-
pants experience events and issues outside of the
interventions in question; currently findings from inter-
ventions report only on the majority view. A full ethical
assessment will require an assessment of the various
components of research studies which includes methods
that are used to determine eligibility and not only a
report of the outcomes achieved.
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the objects of narrative and narrators and it is ‘as narra-
tors that research subjects (and other people and things
related to those objects) will be normatively autono-
mous’ [48]. To fully incorporate this perspective into
intervention research means that there needs to be an
epistemic move in the direction of interrelationship and
interdependency. This will require researchers and those
to be researched to find ways to work collaboratively in
relationships rather than as falsely separated beings
because of the issues of blurred boundaries and ‘con-
tamination of findings’. What is at risk currently is that
we are treating the ‘congeries of symptoms that reveal
themselves to diagnostic tools’ manifest as depression,
PND or IPV and we are forgetting ‘who’ t h ep e o p l ea r e
who are engaged in studies [48].
From the development of narrative oriented accounts
that explore people’s experiences of being screened it is
possible to determine to whom participants feel morally
obligated and how their existing relationships may be
impacted upon by new information. Since knowing new
information brings with it the question of responsibility
about whether that information needs to be shared with
family members or significant others in people’s lives,
researchers would do well to understand the conse-
quences of new knowledge for participants beyond their
rights as individuals. In addition to this, women who
leave situations where they are experiencing IPV are
often highly dependent on supports offered by friends
and family; thus intervention studies impact beyond the
individual. This means coming to see decision-making
as a relational act that is dependent not only on capaci-
ties and competencies but also fundamentally premised
on our existence as dialogical (interdependent) beings.
The act of screening needs to also be explored from
the relational context within which it is occurring.
There have been reported benefits from women about
having postnatal depression acknowledged by a health
professional through screening but further consideration
needs to be given to when this occurs. Delivering a
screen during a hospital or midwifery consultation could
be interpreted by women as an essential element of
their medical care. We also have not explored how
screening impacts on professionals and their views of its
use within intervention studies. This is important to
consider since a study examining US emergency nurses
showed nurses as willing to screen patients who present
with injury for IPV, but there continued to be a reluc-
tance to implement the practice [54]. This reluctance
may lie with the personal values or victimization experi-
ences of nurses or other factors we are yet to determine
such as the influence of the wider social narrative, ‘IPV
is not my business because it is a private matter’ [54].
Considering the broader narratives that shape where
screening takes place is important.
Environment, setting and socio-cultural context
Although one study reported that no safety concerns
resulted from IPV screening of patients, it is important
to ask if the concept of ‘safety concern’ adequately cap-
tures the possible harm associated with screening for
IPV? [7] It may be more appropriate to explore the
i s s u eo fh a r mi naw a yt h a te n a b l e st h es u b j e c t i v e
experiences of those being screened for both depression
and IPV to come forward. For example Koziol-McLain
et al. [54] found in their interviews with women
screened for IPV that while most stated it was fine to be
asked questions concerning IPV, women expressed feel-
ings of surprise, shame and embarrassment when inter-
viewed about their experience. One woman was quoted
as saying that she nearly started crying when she was
asked ‘those things’ but attributed feeling comfortable
because of the person interviewing her; another said
that although it is important to be asked they had not
really dealt with ‘those feelings’ [54]. Bacchus et al [55]
found breaches of confidentiality and other harms as a
result of their screening intervention. This indicates that
‘safety concerns’ are only one part of the question about
harm, beyond the individual is the relational context in
which this asking occurs and the reality that the pre-
vious experience remains an integral part of the person’s
identity (it is embodied).
Table 1 Ethical considerations brought to light considering a narrative and relational approach
Environment/ Setting
Political and policy context
Organizational support / professional training to conduct screening
Provision of resources for follow up
Access to care and services
Decisional pressures
Design of screening tools
Design of studies
Socio-Cultural Context
Labeling groups ‘at-risk’
Victim Blaming
Different cultural understandings of depression and intimate partner violence
Cultural appropriateness of screening tools
Individual Issues
Dealing with new health information
Personal values
Disruption of identity
Stigma and Shame of new diagnosis
Relational Issues
Relational responsibilities
Impact on families
Do I tell people close to me
Attitudes of health professionals
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screening tools in socially and culturally diverse popula-
tions. While screening tools are increasingly being vali-
dated within specific ethnic populations [56], the
possibility of false positives and false negatives from
screening remains high. Moreover, there are questions
as to how well tools capture the culturally nuanced ways
in which depression and IPV experiences are expressed.
It may also be that cultural background influences the
preferred mode of how to ask about these sensitive
issues and there may be culturally shaped attitudes and
beliefs to screening and its results that need to be
considered.
Where to from here?
Table 2 lists some narrative and relationally driven ques-
t i o n st h a tw eh a v ea r r i v e da tf r o mt h i sa n a l y s i s ;t h e
questions are based on the important issues screening
raises which are outlined in table 1. We use the English
language interrogative pronouns – whom, who, whose,
what and which to develop some questions that could
be used to consider the issues. The pronouns are
deployed intentionally because they are narrative based
a n dt h e ya s s i s ti nd r a w i n go u ra t t e n t i o nt ot h ef o u r
main areas that can be overlooked from a view of prin-
ciplism. If we ask a question about what and which we
can explore what the environmental and socio-cultural
issues are and which issues require further consideration
before screening is employed. If we ask some deeper
questions about who our participants may be and to
whom they may be obligated, we can identify whose
interests may or may not be being represented in a
study. Basing our questions on interrogative pronouns is
premised on our day to day use of these words to ask
questions about things that we are not yet aware of.
T h e s eq u e s t i o n s ,w ef e e l ,a r en o tt h eo n l ys o l u t i o nt o
dealing with the ethical complexities of using screening
within intervention studies. However, they provide a
starting point for shifting the focus toward some of the
deeper concerns that incorporating screening raises and
the need to explore these in greater depth so that we
can modify moral principles in light of the particulars of
the situation as Lindemann advocates [53].
Summary
The ethical complexities of using screening to identify
eligible research participants and recruit people to inter-
vention studies for IPV, PND and depression need
further deliberation and debate by researchers, practi-
tioners, research participants and the broader public.
Before screening is incorporated as a method to identify
eligible participants or to recruit, it may be beneficial to
ask if we truly understand who our participants are and
whether their conditions and vulnerability affect the
type of study designs we ought to use. Based on our
assessment, since screening with vulnerable groups
increases vulnerability through the identification of risk,
t h e r es e e m sl i t t l et on oc h o i c eb u tt oo f f e ra na u g m e n -
ted form of treatment as usual or a wait list control.
We have proposed a set of simple, interrogative
questions that are narrative and relationally driven.
These questions will assist to further evaluate the
potential impacts of using screening to identify eligible
research participants and can supplement factors that
a r ec o n s i d e r e db ya p p l y i n gap r i n c i p l eb a s e da p p r o a c h .
We have argued that the justification most commonly
identified from an assessment of screening using prin-
ciplism is based on the potential benefits of the inter-
vention. This needs to be re-evaluated in light of the
possible harms that individuals could experience from
knowing they are at risk of depression or postnatal
depression or making significant life changes because
of being invited to participate in an IPV intervention.
Rather than leave the ethical evaluation to the question
of whether a person’s autonomy was respected, future
intervention studies might do well to consider the
Table 2 Narrative and relationally driven questions to interrogate the use of screening in intervention studies
1. To whom am I morally obligated? Who are the individuals and who matters to them?
Who is screening intended for? Is the group in question vulnerable? Do we understand who the people are who might participate in the
intervention? Do we understand what matters to them and how this will shape their perceived obligations? Will the individuals be likely to feel
stigmatized? Will there be worry and concern about whether to tell others about a potential diagnosis or their situation?
2. Whose interests are being represented?
Whose voice is prominent in the research findings? Do we hear about those who may not wish to participate as much as those who do? What
happens to the people who are identified as at-risk but do not receive further supports, follow up or interventions? What happens to participants
when an intervention is not effective?
3. What environmental and socio-cultural factors need to be accounted for?
Who is involved in delivery and receipt of screening tools? What cultural values are expressed about the practice of screening and the conditions
being screened for? What is the nature of the relationships of those involved in screening? What are the environmental features that are likely
influence decision-making? Is the tool culturally appropriate? What social factors are important to consider? What cultural understandings about
conditions being screened for are important to know about in advance?
4. Which study design and which tools do we use?
Which study designs are ethically justifiable with vulnerable populations? Which screening tools do we select from and how do we account for their
shortfalls? Which processes can be incorporated to ensure that we focus on who our participants are instead of the symptoms revealed by
diagnostic and identification tools?
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t i o n sw eh a v ep u tf o r w a r d .T h is requires seeing people
as situated within their social and cultural contexts
and existing within relationships that are likely to be
affected by the results of screening information. New
information may burden people and engagement in
studies change individuals and those with whom they
exist in relation, even if only partially.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Table: Three examples of intervention studies using
screening as a component.
Additional file 2: Table: Screening for depression and IPV – the
guidance offered by principlism.
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